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Abstract 
This paper argues that the extent to which national administrations transpose EU directives in a 
timely fashion may be related to how transposition is coordinated inside national ministries. 
Focusing on transposition through secondary legislation in Estonia, Poland and Slovenia, the 
paper finds initial evidence that oversight can contribute to better transposition performance. 
Ministries with strong internal oversight tend to be better at timely transposition, while 
ministries with no or weak oversight perform worse. The results tend to hold if one controls for 
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1. INTRODUCTION1
Many EU implementation studies have shown that the effectiveness of national 
administrations critically determines the extent to which member states comply with 
European Union laws (see Mbaye 2001; Kaeding 2006; Hille and Knill 2006; Haverland and 
Romeijn 2007; Toshkov 2007, 2008). This is an important finding which provides support for 
the ‘management school’ in EU compliance research (Tallberg 2002). According to this 
approach, member states fail to implement EU laws not as matter of preference but because of 
their limited capacities to achieve compliance. However, in exploring the role of 
administrative factors, the existing research rarely links performance to specific institutional 
configurations (but see Jensen 2007; Zubek 2005; 2008; Dimitrova and Toshkov 2009). Most 
scholars typically resort to statistical analyses using aggregate perception-based indicators of 
bureaucratic efficiency. Relatively little is thus known about what types of administrative 
structures lead to better transposition performance and whether such effects hold across EU 
member states.  
 
This paper examines the impact of different oversight practices inside national ministries on 
the timeliness of transposition through secondary legislation. Two institutional models are 
identified: (i) centralized systems that presuppose the existence of powerful monitors inside 
ministries with competences to oversee the work of individual directorates; (ii) decentralized 
systems in which oversight is limited or absent and where individual directorates enjoy 
relative autonomy in handling transposition tasks. In classifying oversight practices, the paper 
draws on a qualitative assessment of rules-in-use that govern the transposition process. The 
key question considered is that of whether different configurations of oversight lead to 
systematic differences in performance of individual ministries. Drawing on delegation theory, 
the paper hypothesizes that – all else equal – centralized systems should ensure more timely 
transposition than the decentralized systems. This expectation is tested against empirical 
                                            
1The financial support from the Ernst & Young Better Government programme is gratefully acknowledged. The 
authors would like to thank Irena Baclija, Leno Saarnit, Riho Kangur and Agnieszka Cielen who have provided 
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evidence on transposition through secondary legislation from 21 ministries in Estonia, Poland 
and Slovenia for the period from 1 January 2005 to 31 December 2008.  
The rest of the article proceeds as follows. The next section briefly reviews the research on the 
impact of administrative factors on compliance with EU law. It then formulates theoretical 
expectations regarding the effect of internal oversight as well as identifies other explanatory 
factors that may affect transposition performance. Section 3 presents a comprehensive scheme 
for classifying oversight practices and discusses the operationalization of key variables. The 
following two sections provide an overview of oversight procedures established in 21 
ministries in Estonia, Poland and Slovenia and subsequently check the impact of differences 
in institutional configurations on transposition performance. The concluding section assesses 
the relevance of the results for the study of EU compliance. 
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2. BUREAUCRATIC EFFICIENCY AND EU LAW 
TRANSPOSITION 
2.1. Literature Review 
There are many studies that show that bureaucratic capacities shape transposition 
performance. In a path-breaking analysis of the implementation of seventeen directives in all 
EU member states, Siedentopf and Ziller (1988) argue that the quality of governmental 
coordination is a key determinant of successful transposition. Richardson (1996) links 
transposition performance to administrative styles prevalent in the national polity. More 
recently, many quantitative studies have found that the efficiency of national bureaucracies 
has a strong impact on transposition performance. Mbay (2001) shows that the structure of 
the civil service has a strong effect on the number of infringements initiated against a member 
state (see also Börzel et al. 2007; Haverland and Romeijn 2007). Falkner et. al (2005, 2008) find 
that the level of available administrative resources affects the success of transposition. Many 
scholars also show that the general measures of bureaucratic strength are positive predictors 
of transposition record (Berglund et al. 2006; Hille and Knill 2006; Toshkov 2007, 2008; but 
see Steunenberg and Toshkov 2009).  
Most of the recent research resorts to using aggregate indicators of bureaucratic efficiency and 
relatively few studies attempt to link specific administrative factors to transposition 
performance. There are, however, exceptions. Dimitrakopoulos (2001, 2008) establishes that 
implementation of EU laws depends on the presence of robust central and sectoral 
coordination at national level. Jensen (2007) shows how the type of oversight that central 
governments use to monitor compliance by agencies influences how quickly member states 
resolve infringement proceedings. More specifically, he argues that ‘police-patrol’ oversight is 
more effective than ‘fire-alarm’ mechanisms. Zubek (2005, 2008) demonstrates how the 
strength of core executive oversight over ministerial departments affects the extent to which 
the latter comply with transposition commitments. The argument is that higher centralization 
of authority inside national cabinets facilitates timely adaptation to EU laws. More recently, 
Dimitrova and Toshkov (2009) explore the relationship between EU co-ordination structures Working Paper No: 09/2010    Page 7 of 32 
and problems with EU implementation. They show that, while stronger coordination leads to 
more timely transposition, this effect is conditioned by the salience of transposition measures.  
2.2. Conceptual Framework 
It is a conventional wisdom that transposition of EU directives is in the hands of national 
ministries. Ministries are responsible for initiating the process and – in many cases – are also 
the final decision-makers. What is less well recognized is that ministries are not unitary actors 
(but see Steunenberg 2006). At the very least, ministerial departments house two types of 
actors: political appointees (ministers and deputy ministers) and bureaucrats (directorates and 
units). It is often assumed that ministers act as principals who formulate policy, while 
bureaucrats are agents who implement it (Huber 2000; Strom 2000). In practice, and in EU 
transposition in particular, the picture is more complex. The extent to which political 
appointees control policy-making varies across different settings and it is not unusual for civil 
servants to take active part in both policy formulation and implementation. What is crucial, 
however, is that inside ministerial departments there normally exist some individual or 
collective actors who make policy commitments (ministerial principals) and lower-level actors 
who implement such commitments (ministerial agents).  
Any delegation of authority creates the risk that agents either will not perform the delegated 
task or will do so in a way contrary to the interests of the principal (Pratt and Zeckhauser 
1985; Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991). This is especially the case if the principals do not know 
the true preferences of the agents and cannot observe their actions. Such ‘shirking’ can be 
deliberate – when agents have private interests that diverge from those of their principal. It 
can also be non-deliberate – when agents lack the necessary resources or fail to perform due to 
problems of communication or occurrence of random events. In the area of EU transposition, 
the ministerial agents responsible for transposition may be influenced by special interests that 
oppose national compliance. They may also lack the necessary time and personnel to 
effectively carry out EU-related legal implementation tasks. As a result, complete and correct 
transposition of EU directives may be blocked or delayed at ministry level.  Working Paper No: 09/2010    Page 8 of 32 
Such agency losses can be mitigated by oversight. The literature identifies four main types of 
mechanisms: contract design, screening and selection, monitoring and reporting, institutional 
checks (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991: 27-34). The first two make it possible to safeguard 
against agency losses before delegation (ex ante  mechanisms), while the other two after 
delegation (ex-post mechanisms). Oversight may also be reinforced through the presence of an 
enforcer or supervisor – a special type of agent whose role is to monitor and report on the 
actions of other agents (Alchian and Demsetz 1972; Tallberg 2003). Research on the national 
coordination of EU transposition indeed demonstrates that many domestic ministries 
establish internal oversight mechanisms to control the way in which directorates and other 
units discharge transposition tasks (cf. Kaeding 2007; Dimitrakopoulos 2008; Zubek 2008; 
2010 forthcoming).  
This discussion makes it possible to formulate the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: The presence of strong departmental oversight increases the probability of 
timely transposition.  
It must, however, be recognized that the full support of ministerial principals for the policy 
commitments they enter into cannot be assumed in all settings. This is particularly true for 
transposition of EU directives. National ministries transpose policies that have been agreed 
jointly with other member states, Commission officials and the European Parliament. Since 
EU laws are decided collectively by many national and supranational actors, often through 
majority voting, any national actor has a restricted influence over the final outcome. It is thus 
possible that while the ministerial principals formally endorse the transposition of a directive, 
they have a strong preference for delaying or blocking the actual implementation. This may 
have significant implications for the effectiveness of internal oversight. Regardless of how 
diligent ministerial agents are in discharging transposition tasks and how effective the internal 
oversight is, the principals are likely to be reluctant to approve the new domestic measures. In 
short, the effect of internal oversight can be expected to be conditional on the preferences of 
the ministerial actors who enter into transposition commitments.  Working Paper No: 09/2010    Page 9 of 32 
Hypothesis 2: The effect of internal oversight will decline if ministerial principals contest 
the contents of the directive.  
Departmental oversight is only one of many factors that affect transposition performance and 
the list of potential predictors is long and complex (see Toshkov 2010 for a recent review). 
The present analysis controls for the impact of two key factors: (i) transposition workload, 
and (ii) country effects. With regard  to the former, national ministries that have few 
transposition commitments may exhibit systematically different patterns of performance from 
ministries with many transposition tasks. Research has so far paid limited attention to 
ministerial workloads as an explanatory factor. It has, however, been shown that some types of 
directives are easier to transpose than others (Mastenbroek 2003; Luetgert and Dannwolf 
2009). Moreover, other studies have found evidence that the higher the complexity and 
political sensitivity of the EU provisions, the more likely that transposition will be delayed 
(Kaeding 2006; Steunenberg and Kaeding 2009). In line with these arguments, one can 
formulate the following expectation: 
Hypothesis 3: Transposition performance of a national  ministry will be lower if a 
ministry has a heavy transposition workload. 
National ministries may find EU transposition more or less difficult depending on country-
specific circumstances. Two opposing propositions can be formulated. On the one hand, 
much research finds that large countries are in a better position to delay or resist legal 
adaptation (see e.g. Sverdrup 2004; Jensen 2007). This may be related to the Commission’s 
reluctance to refer cases against such states to the ECJ. On the other hand, it has also been 
suggested that large countries with high voting power at the EU level may be able to shape 
Community legislation in such a way as to minimize the substantive misfit with domestic 
circumstances (Mbay 2001). Arguably, such state power arguments may have less relevance to 
new EU member states that have had limited experience of EU decision-making. In any case, 
this discussion leads one to expect that: Working Paper No: 09/2010    Page 10 of 32 
Hypothesis 4: National ministries in small countries will exhibit a different pattern of 
transposition performance from ministries in large countries. 
 
3. DATA AND OPERATIONALIZATION  
The above theoretical expectations are tested against empirical data on oversight practices in 
21 ministries in Estonia, Poland and Slovenia. Small-n comparisons do not, of course, allow 
for advanced tests of theories, yet they are useful as a first stage of research before a more 
detailed analysis is undertaken (cf. Lijphart 1971). The selection of ministries from three new 
EU member states allows one to keep constant factors such as democratic experience and the 
length of EU membership. All states are relatively new parliamentary democracies and all 
started accession negotiations in 1998 and joined the EU in 2004. The focus on new EU 
member states may, of course, limit the generalizability of the findings for all of the EU-27, an 
issue that is adressed in the concluding part of the article. The remainder of this section 
discusses the operationalization of individual variables and methods of data collection.  
3.1. Departmental Oversight 
To map the strength of oversight, this article examines the rules-in-use governing the 
processes of transposition inside ministries, and in particular the role of two types of 
coordinating units: (i) horizontal legislative services and (ii) specialized EU coordination 
units. Rules are defined as shared understandings regarding what action is required, 
prohibited or permitted. The constellation of rules-in-use is examined in three dimensions: 
transposition planning, legal review and monitoring of deadlines (see Table 1). 
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Table 1: Analytical Framework: Internal Departmental Oversight  
 
Oversight Mechanism  Monitor’s Powers 
Transposition Planning 
 Draft positions 
 Transposition plans 
 Cabinet plans 
checks if draft positions identify transposing measures (1) 
assigns responsibility for transposition (0.33); verifies line directorate plans (0.33); requests intermediate deadlines (0.33) 
checks if general government legislative plans contain all transposing measures (1) 
Legal Review 
 Substantive check  
 Horizontal measures 
 Drafting assistance 
 verifies all transposing drafts against the text of directives (1) 
 drafts horizontal measures (1) 
 assigns lawyer/expert to substantive directorate to jointly work on drafting measures (1) 
Deadline Monitoring 
 Central timetable 
 Reports & reminders 
 Sanctions 
 maintains a centralized list of all transposition obligations of its ministry (1) 
 reports regularly to senior management (0.5); sends individual reminders to directorates (0.5) 
 sanctions (name/shame, alerts, etc) if delays are identified (1) 
Source: own compilation (weights assigned to institutional features in parentheses). Working Paper No: 09/2010                           Page 12 of 32 
With regard to planning, the key question is whether there exists an institutional monitor 
with responsibility for coordinating transposition programming. Three issues are of particular 
relevance. First, the monitor may have the right to check if ministerial positions for EU 
decision-making identify transposition implications. Ensuring that legal problems are 
identified early in the legislative process is likely to have a positive impact on implementation. 
The second issue is the monitor’s role in coordinating transposition planning: does the 
monitor have the power to allocate responsibility for transposition; verify plans drawn up by 
line units; and negotiate intermediate deadlines? A strong control over the planning process at 
directorate level is likely to prevent non-deliberate and deliberate gaps in transposition. The 
final question is whether the monitor checks if annual work plans of the cabinet contain all 
required EU-related items. The capacity to integrate parallel planning processes can ensure 
that transposition commitments are not overlooked.  
In legal review, the key issue is whether there exists a monitor that facilitates the drafting work 
once the need for transposition has been established. Three types of oversight can benefit the 
transposition process. First, the monitor may screen all EU-related legislation prepared by line 
directorates. This may involve the right to verify all transposing draft legislation against the 
text of directives for correct and full transposition. Second, the monitor may have the 
authority to draft horizontal measures on its own. This is likely to facilitate the transposition 
of directives which cut across the traditional organizational boundaries. Third, the monitor 
may be in a position to provide active drafting assistance by seconding experts to work jointly 
with line directorates. This is likely to assist in avoiding delays in cases of insufficient expertise 
or manpower. 
As regards the monitoring of transposition deadlines, the crucial question is whether there 
exists a monitor that checks transposition progress. Three kinds of oversight capacities are 
important. First, the monitor may maintain a centralized list of transposition commitments. 
The presence of such timetabling instruments is helpful in preventing non-deliberate 
omissions. Second, it is crucial that the monitor have the right to report on progress regularly 
to the senior management and to send reminders to line directorates regarding upcoming Working Paper No: 09/2010                           Page 13 of 32 
deadlines. This type of monitoring mobilizes line directorates behind the transposition tasks 
and penalizes deliberate or non-deliberate shirking. Finally, the monitor may have the 
authority to take remedial action or impose some form of sanctions if delays are identified. 
The monitor may, for example, regularly ‘name and shame’ line directorates that are in 
persistent delay.  
The data on the rules governing transposition processes inside 21 ministries in Estonia, 
Poland and Slovenia come from around 70 semi-structured interviews conducted in Tallinn, 
Ljubljana and Warsaw in 2009-2010. The interviewees were top civil servants from legal and 
EU coordinating units and some line directorates. Transposition practices were also studied 
based on internal documents provided by the ministries and other written sources. The 
interviews and the documentary analysis focused on establishing the typical configuration of 
oversight in the period from 2005 to 2008. The collected data was used to arrive at aggregate 
scores ranging from 0 (limited oversight) to 9 (extensive oversight) for each ministry based on 
a uniform scoring system. Where the pattern of oversight changed during the examined 
period, the scores were weighted accordingly. A broad range of ministries has been surveyed 
covering all the main policy sectors2
                                            
2The study covered the following ministries in Poland: Agriculture and Rural Development; Economy (inc. 
Economics & Labour until 2005); Environment; Finance; Health; Infrastructure (inc. Transport & Construction 
Ministry 2005-6 and Transport Ministry 2006-7); Labour and Social Affairs. In Slovenia, these were: Agriculture, 
Forestry and Food; Economy; Environment and Spatial Planning; Finance; Health; Interior; Labour, Family and 
Social Affairs; Transport. In Estonia, these were: Agriculture, Economy, Environment, Finance, Interior, Social 
Affairs.   
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3.2. Transposition Performance 
In measuring transposition performance, this article focuses on the extent to which the 
national governments notified the transposition of EU directives in a timely manner. This 
choice of operationalization is, of course, not without problems (see Hartlapp and Falkner 
2009 for a recent critique). Yet, in contrast to much existing research, rather than using the 
Eur-Lex data, the analysis relies on original data on the notification of domestic implementing 
measures obtained from member state governments: the State Chancellery in Estonia, the 
Office of the Committee for European Integration in Poland, and the Government Office for 
Legislation in Slovenia. These data contain more detailed information than the Eur-Lex 
database including otherwise unavailable information regarding lead ministries responsible 
for transposition, precise dates of notifications, the extent to which transposition is judged to 
be complete, and whether national authorities considered transposition necessary.  
The dataset for analysis was  constructed as follows. First, a list of all directives with 
transposition deadlines between 1 January 2005 and 31 December 2008 was drawn up using 
the annual Commission reports on monitoring the application of Community law. There 
were 426 such directives in Estonia, 432 in Poland and 423 in Slovenia. In the second step, 
some directives were excluded from analysis. These were: (i) directives whose transposition 
was not considered necessary by member states3 and (ii) directives within the competence of 
ministries not covered by the empirical survey4. Ten directives were excluded because they 
had two or more transposition deadlines one of which was later than 31 December 20085
                                            
3 It is by no means straight-forward to establish whether transposition is considered necessary in a member state. 
For present purposes it was assumed that such measures fall into two categories: (i) directives that formally apply 
to a member state, but for some objective reasons are not relevant (e.g. the member state has no inland 
waterways which are regulated by a directive); (ii) directives that are relevant to the situation of a member state, 
but the existing domestic legislation requires no changes. The information on type (i) directives was obtained 
from member state governments, while the data on type (ii) directives was extracted from the Eur-lex database 
selecting directives for which transposition was considered complete but all implementing measures were 
adopted before the date of adoption of the directive (or before 01/01/1999 in the case of directives adopted before 
accession). 
. 
4The high number of excluded directives in Poland (see Table 2) is due to the fact that the transposition of many 
health-related directives was within the competence of a specialized agency, the General Sanitary Inspectorate. 
5If directives had two or more transposition deadlines, the later deadline was used as a reference point for 
assessing transposition performance.  Working Paper No: 09/2010                           Page 15 of 32 
Perhaps most importantly, directives for the transposition of which a parliamentary law was 
required were also excluded from the dataset6
Table 2: EU Directives in the Sample 
. This was done because the key explanatory 
variable  –  departmental oversight –  can be assumed to have a limited impact on the 
parliamentary stage of the transposition process. See Table 2. 
 
Directives  Estonia  Poland  Slovenia 
Directives with transposition deadlines 
between 01/01/2005 and 31/12/2008 
426  432  423 
  Transposition not necessary  
Other ministries in charge 
At least one deadline outside 2005-8 













Final sample selection  178  128  229 
    *including one directive for which information is missing. 
The final dataset contained 178 directives from Estonia, 128 from Poland, 229 from Slovenia. 
The transposition record for each directive was calculated using three types of information: 
the transposition deadline, the date of notification of the last measure to the European 
Commission, and the member state assessment of whether the transposition was full or partial 
(as at 31 July 2009). All directives for which the last notification occurred before deadline7
                                            
6This was done based on the analysis of implementing measures for each directive using the Eur-lex database or 
the information obtained from national administrations in the case of directives for which transposition was 
incomplete at the end of July 2009. In the former case, only parliamentary laws adopted after the date of adoption 
of the directive were considered. For directives adopted before accession, only parliamentary laws adopted after 
01/01/1999 (effective start of accession negotiations) were considered. 
 and 
where the member state considered transposition complete were coded as transposed on time. 
The remaining directives were identified as delayed. In total, 91 out of 178 directives were 
transposed on time in Estonia; 62 out of 128 in Poland; and 99 out of 226 in Slovenia. These 
figures show that the transposition of 40-50 per cent of the EU directives in the sample was 
7It was assumed that directives transposed within +/- 7 days after deadline were transposed before the deadline. 
This was to make allowances for transposition deadlines falling on a weekend or public holiday. The results 
reported in the remaining part of the article do not change substantively when perfomance is calculated strictly. Working Paper No: 09/2010                           Page 16 of 32 
considered to be complete before the transposition deadline. This indicates a rather low 
degree of transposition timeliness, especially that the sample contained only the directives 
whose transposition did not require parliamentary action.  
3.3. Operationalization of Other Variables 
With regard to the preferences of ministerial principals, one would ideally need to examine 
the preferences of senior management for each directive and the extent to which the final 
compromise at the EU level reflected these interests (see e.g. Thomson et al. 2007). This paper 
resorts to a simpler and, arguably, less precise measure. It examines the preferences of the 
parties that appointed ministers to each of the 21 ministries. In particular, it focuses on 
support for EU integration using the evidence from the 2006 Chapel Hill expert survey 
(Hooghe et al. 2008). These data provide useful assessments of different parties’ strength of 
support for the EU in 2006 on a scale of 1 (strongly opposed) to 7 (strongly in favour). The 
scores for the individual ministries were calculated by, first, allocating the ‘EU preference’ 
score to each directive in the dataset according to the party of the minister in office at the date 
of the transposition deadline. In the second step, the mean value for each ministry was 
calculated and transformed into a dummy variable coded 0 if the mean was 5 or less and 1 
otherwise (the score of 5 denotes a survey response of ‘somewhat in favour’ of EU 
integration).  
As regards transposition workload, this analysis uses two proxies. The first is the number of 
directives to be transposed by a given ministry in the period from 1 January 2005 to 31 
December 2008. This figure can be calculated either as the number of all directives to be 
transposed regardless of the type of domestic legislation required for full transposition, or as 
the number of all directives to be transposed through delegated legislation.  For present 
purposes the latter figure is used as one more closely corresponding to the measurement of 
transposition performance. The use of nominal workload as an indicator is not without its 
problems, not least because all directives are treated as having equal weight. To address this 
issue, the analysis introduces a second proxy – the total number of words contained in the Working Paper No: 09/2010                           Page 17 of 32 
directives to be transposed by a given ministry. This measure better captures the differences in 
workloads across ministries. Total wordcounts can be measured either including or excluding 
the technical annexes attached to directives. The latter version is preferred here as one 
reflecting more truly the distinction between substantive and technical legislation.  
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4. DEPARTMENTAL OVERSIGHT IN 21 MINISTRIES 
This  section discusses the oversight procedures in 21 ministries in Estonia, Poland and 
Slovenia, with a focus on the role of legal services and EU coordination units in the area of 
transposition planning, legal review and deadline monitoring (see Figure 1 for a summary of 
assessments).  
4.1. Estonia  
The six Estonian ministries surveyed for this project had varying capacities for internal 
oversight. The Ministries of Agriculture and Social Affairs had the most extensive 
mechanisms. In the area of transposition planning, the coordinators in both ministries 
performed regular checks of whether legal implications were identified in draft positions 
during EU-level decision-making. In the Social Affairs Ministry, the EU and legal services 
exercised a firm grip over planning at the line directorate level. They assigned responsibility 
for the transposition of new directives and checked if line directorates’ plans were realistic. 
Both ministries had strong internal capacities for legal assistance. The coordinating units 
provided regular drafting assistance and, in some cases, drafted cross-cutting implementing 
measures themselves. Both ministries had fairly well-developed mechanisms for monitoring 
transposition progress, although neither maintained its own database of transposition 
commitments. The EU units provided quarterly or half-yearly reports to senior management. 
Regular reminders were sent to line directorates and laggards were ‘named and shamed’ 
during meetings with the minister.  
The other four ministries – Economics, Finance, Interior and Environment – had, by and 
large, weak oversight arrangements. Ministerial coordinators made sure that draft positions 
identify legal implications, but they had no or limited role in controlling the planning of 
transposition. In the area of legal review, the legal services in the Economics Ministry 
performed a regular in-depth verification of the correctness of transposition, but such checks 
were not performed in the other three ministries. Central drafting assistance was generally 
available, except in the Environment Ministry where there was no whole-ministry legal Working Paper No: 09/2010                           Page 19 of 32 
service. Some reporting of transposition progress was undertaken, but was either infrequent 
or ad hoc. None of the four ministries maintained a specialized database of transposition 
commitments.  
4.2. Poland 
The analysis of seven Polish ministries reveals that, in 2005-2008, the strength of oversight 
varied from weak to medium. The most developed mechanisms existed in the Agriculture 
Ministry and the Labour and Social Policy Ministry. In the area of transposition planning, 
departmental coordinators in both ministries performed ad hoc checks of draft positions, 
exercised some control over planning at directorate level and, from time to time, made sure 
that EU commitments were integrated into general government plans. Both ministries had 
rather weak oversight capacities for legal review, but excelled at monitoring. The Agriculture 
Ministry maintained its own database of transposition commitments. A similar, although 
slightly less detailed, database was also maintained by the Ministry for Labour and Social 
Affairs. In both ministries, the senior management received regular reports on transposition 
progress. The coordinators reminded line directorates of upcoming transposition 
commitments on a regular basis.  
Some oversight mechanisms were also present in the Ministries of Infrastructure, Health and 
Finance, in particular in the field of planning and legal review. Yet, compared to the 
Agriculture Ministry and Labour and Social Policy Ministry, the capacities for monitoring 
transposition progress were more limited. In the Finance Ministry, half-yearly reports were 
prepared for the senior management. In the other ministries, information was only available 
on request to the deputy minister responsible for EU affairs. The coordinating units reminded 
line directorates of upcoming deadlines on an ad hoc basis. The remaining two ministries – 
Economy and Environment – had limited oversight arrangements.  There was no central 
control over transposition planning at directorate level in the Economy Ministry, and weak 
capacities for such oversight in the Environment Ministry. Legal review was limited or ad hoc. Working Paper No: 09/2010                           Page 20 of 32 
Neither ministry maintained a central database of transposition commitments or made 
provisions for regular reporting to the senior management.  
4.3. Slovenia 
The survey of eight Slovenian ministries reveals much variation in the use of oversight at 
ministry level. Two ministries stand out in terms of the strength of oversight in 2005-2008 – 
Interior and Agriculture. The coordinators in both these ministries checked draft positions to 
ensure that legal implications were identified. They were also actively controlling the planning 
process: assigning responsibility and agreeing key working deadlines with line directorates. In 
both ministries, the coordinating departments were often involved in the actual drafting and 
reviewing of transposition legislation. In addition, the coordinating departments verified the 
correctness and completeness of implementing measures against the text of the EU directives. 
In monitoring and reporting, both monitors developed a rigorous system for information 
flows: individual reminders were sent directly to responsible officials and there was regular 
reporting to the management. In the Ministry of Interior, the legal service regularly ‘named 
and shamed’ line directorates that were found in delay. The coordinators in both ministries 
maintained a centralized list of all transposition tasks, updated it regularly and circulated it to 
all directorates every second month.  
Three ministries in Slovenia had a medium strength of internal oversight: Health, Labour and 
Transport. The EU services in the Ministries of Labour and Health had fairly strong roles in 
transposition planning, while the coordinating service in the Ministry of Transport had a 
weaker role. The EU unit in the Ministry of Labour was not involved in legal review, while 
legal review was undertaken in the Ministries of Health and Transport. In terms of 
transposition monitoring, there was regular reporting to the ministerial management in all 
three ministries. In the three remaining ministries - Economy, Finance and Environment – 
oversight was limited. The coordinating units had no or limited role in supporting 
transposition planning. In legal review, legal departments reviewed draft legislation (including 
transposition measures) for national legal compliance, but they did not perform any Working Paper No: 09/2010                           Page 21 of 32 
additional tasks such as reviewing correctness of transposition. The services did not draft 
horizontal legislation and did not assign lawyers to assist substantive departments. There were 
no special reporting and monitoring requirements beyond the general monitoring of the 
annual cabinet work plan.  
Figure 1: Departmental Oversight in Estonia, Poland and Slovenia 
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5. OVERSIGHT AND TRANSPOSITION PERFORMANCE 
This section checks if departmental oversight affected transposition performance of ministries 
in Estonia, Poland and Slovenia. Before presenting the results, a few words are in order about 
constructing a reliable indicator of performance. First, the number of directives transposed on 
time can be divided by the total number of directives that each ministry had to transpose in 
2005-8. This seems to be the most straight-forward way of comparing performance across 
ministries. Its weakness, however, is that it weighs all directives equally regardless of 
substantive complexity, which creates a risk of inflating performance by giving 
disproportionate weight to timely transposition of minor directives. This problem is 
particularly pronounced when the transposition workloads vary across ministries. The 
analysis thus introduces a second indicator of performance calculated by dividing the total 
wordcount of the directives transposed on time by total wordcount of all directives to be 
transposed in 2005-8. Although wordcount is a crude measure, it is often used as a proxy for 
complexity of legislation, and hence can be useful in constructing a measure of performance 
that is sensitive to variation in the nature of EU directives.  
Figures 2(a) and 2(b) present the relationship between the degree of departmental oversight 
and transposition performance in each of the three countries and across all of the survyed 
ministries. In Figure 2(a) the proportion of directives transposed on time is used as a measure 
of performance. The graph reveals a strong positive relationship between the two variables. 
The association is pronounced in Poland and Slovenia and slightly less so in Estonia. 
Ministries with a higher degree of internal oversight tend to achieve higher transposition 
performance than those with more limited oversight arrangements. Figure 2(b) shows the 
association between the two variables using the wordcount-based indicator of performance. 
The plots for Poland and Slovenia are almost the same as in Figure 1(a), but the data for 
Estonia show virtually no association. A closer examination reveals that the latter result is 
driven mainly by a depressed score for the Agriculture Ministry and an elevated score for the 
Finance Ministry. In the graph for all ministries, the positive relationship is still visible, but 
there are many outliers, chiefly ministries with low oversight but high performance scores.  Working Paper No: 09/2010                           Page 23 of 32 
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What happens to the relationship between oversight and performance when other factors are 
taken into account? Table 3 presents the results from a series of ordinal logistic regression 
models. OLS regression is not appropriate for the analysis of proportions because such data 
are not normally distributed and are also bounded between 0 and 1. To use ordinal logistic 
regression, the measures of performance were rescaled as follows: scores between 0 and 0.20 
were coded as 1, 0.21-0.40 as 2, 0.41-0.60 as 3, 0.61-0.80 as 4, and 0.81-1.00 as 5. Models 1 to 3 
were estimated using the proportion of directives transposed on time, while models 4 to 6 
using the wordcount-based indicator of performance. The first thing to note is that in all 
models including predictors into the analysis significantly improves our ability to predict the 
level of transposition performance. The goodness of fit is moderate with Pseudo R ranging 
between 0.23 to 0.43.  
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Table 3: Ordinal Logistic Regression Results 
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The results show that the effect of oversight on performance tends to hold well if one controls 
for country effects, party preferences and transposition workload. In all models the B 
coefficient is positive and statistically significant at least at 0.05 level. Ministries with higher 
degress of departmental oversight on average tend to perform better than ministries with 
more limited oversight arrangements. The size of this effect varies, but a conservative estimate 
from Models 4 and 5 show that a one-unit increase in departmental oversight boosts the odds 
of a national ministry being in any higher category of transposition performance by almost 
two and a half times (exp(0.873) = 2.394). In contrast to what could be expected, the impact of 
oversight seems to decrease (rather than increase) if the minister has a positive attitude 
towards EU integration. But this effect is significant (at the 0.1 level) only if the wordcount-
based indicator of transposition performance is used.  
The results for other explanatory factors are mixed. The country size argument does not seem 
to work with the present data. Ministries in Poland tend to perform less well than ministries 
in Estonia but better than ministries in Slovenia, although statistical significance of this effect 
varies. The analysis also shows that ministries in Estonia tend to achieve better performance 
than those in Slovenia, and this result is significant at 0.05 level. Regarding the impact of 
workload, the direction of the coefficients is in line with expectations, but the size of the effect 
is small and it is significant only in model 6 (at 0.1 level). Finally, as expected, ministries 
headed by ministers from political parties supportive of the EU tend to have better 
transposition records than those led by eurosceptic parties. The size of this effect is substantial 
– the odds of ministries with EU-friendly ministers being in a higher category of performance 
are between nine to eleven times higher than those of the other ministries.  
The robustness of the results has been verified, first, by checking for the presence of influential 
cases. Since obtaining residuals for ordinal logistic regression is not possible in standard 
statistical packages, all models were re-estimated by dropping each case in turn, but there was 
no substantive change of the results. In the second step, collinearity checks were performed. 
The diagnostics flagged two potential problems for the present analysis. First, ministerial 
support for the EU integration is highly country-specific. It is high in Slovenia, moderate in Working Paper No: 09/2010                           Page 27 of 32 
Estonia, and low in Poland. The high correlation between country and ministerial stance on 
the EU implies that it may be difficult to disentangle the effects of these factors on 
transposition performance. Furthemore, the moderating effect of EU support on the impact of 
oversight may be driven mainly by country-specific characteristics. As shown in Figure 2(a,b), 
oversight has a slightly less strong effect in Slovenia than in Poland, and EU support is 
generally higher in the former than in the latter.  
Second, and perhaps more importantly, oversight tends to be strongly associated with 
transposition workload when it is measured by the total number of directives to be transposed 
(but not in the case of the other indicator). Pearson’s coefficient of correlation between the 
two variables stands at 0.62 (significant at the 0.01 level). Ministries with many directives to 
transpose are likely to develop extensive oversight capacities and vice-a-versa. Indeed, if one 
conducts a mediation analysis it becomes clear that oversight may almost completely mediate 
the relationship between the number of directives and transposition performance. The 
number of the directives to be transposed is –  on its own –  a significant predictor of 
performance and is also a significant predictor of departmental oversight. It fails, however, to 
be a significant predictor of performance in models 1 to 3 when one controls for oversight. 
This problem is not present if one uses the proportion of wordcounts as an indicator for 
performance which suggests that more confidence should be placed in the results from models 
4, 5 and 6.  
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6. CONCLUSION 
This article provides initial evidence that ministries with strong internal oversight tend to 
perform better in terms of their transposition record than ministries with limited or no 
internal oversight. This effect holds if one controls for other factors and introduces different 
specifications of the dependent variable. This said, the analysis has clear limitations, not least 
because of the small number of cases and the issues of collinearity identified above. Moreover, 
a focus on transposition via secondary legislation leaves the more ‘political’ instances of 
transposition out of the picture and it is thus an open question if oversight can improve 
performance in such cases. Research by Toshkov and Dimitrova (2009) implies, for example, 
that central coordination is rather ineffective where transposition becomes politicized.  
A further issue is whether the findings can be generalized to all EU member states. Much 
research shows that the transfer of EU rules to East Central Europe is greatly influenced by 
state weakness and lack of administrative capacities (Falkner et al. 2008; Dimitrova 2010). If 
this is true, it could be argued, for example, that departmental oversight may be an important 
predictor of transposition performance in states with weak administrative capacity, but it will 
have limited impact in states where bureaucracies are strong. In the latter case, civil servants 
can be simply expected to have sufficient resources and esprit de corps to ensure timely EU 
implementation as a matter of course. This is an interesting possibility which must be 
explored in future research, in particular by comparing patterns of oversight and performance 
across new and old EU member states. 
Nothwithstanding its limitations, the analysis resonates well with recent studies that have 
linked the extent to which EU member states comply with EU law with the strength of 
ministerial coordination and oversight. The findings support, for example, the contention by 
Berglund et al. (2006) that transposition performance depends on whether there exist 
departments that specialize in transposition and whether they have had the time to develop 
relevant bureaucratic  routines. They further confirm the finding by Jensen (2007) that 
oversight of the centralized ‘police-patrol’ type contributes to better compliance than that of 
the decentralized ‘fire-alarm’ variety. Finally, they chime with the work by Dimitrakopoulos Working Paper No: 09/2010                           Page 29 of 32 
(2001, 2008) who shows that central and sector-specific coordination is the backbone for 
effective national compliance with policy commitments made in Brussels. 
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